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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MEMBERS OF THE UTAH STATE MO-
TEL ASSOCIATION, through RALPH 
D. HOWE, their President, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TI-lE STATE 0 F UTAH, through its TAX 
COMMISSION, consisting of OR-
VILLE GUNTHER, Chairman; AL-
LAN M. LIPTON, ARIAS G. BEL-
NAP, and HERBERT F. SMART, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9201 
This is an action contesting the constitutionality of certain 
additions to Section 59-15-4 (The Sales Tax Law) which were 
passed by the 1959 legislature. These additions are as follows: 
(e) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or 
charged for all services for repairs or renovations of 
tangible personal property, or for installation of tan-
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gible personal property rendered in connection with 
other tangible personal property. 
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amou~t paid or 
charo-ed for tourist home, hotel, motel or tratler Court 
acco~modations and services; provided that this sub-
section shall not apply to the amount paid or charged 
for tourist home, motel, hotel or trailer court where 
residency is maintained continuously under the terms 
of a lease or similar agreement for a period of not less 
than thirty days. 
(g) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or 
charged for laundry and dry cleaning services. 
It was the contention of the plaintiffs in the District Court 
that paragraph (f) is in violation of the 14th amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 24 
of the Constitution of Utah, each of which guarantees equal 
protection of the law to all persons. 
The appellants, who are members of the Utah State Motel 
Association, filed its action in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County on the cons_titutionality of said act and prayed that the 
defendant, State Tax Commission, be restrained from enforc-
ing its provision against them. In response the State Tax 
Commission moved for a dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. 
After hearing arguments and the submission of briefs, the 
Honorable lvfaurice Harding, sitting as judge of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, rendered a memorandum decision 
dismissing the action on the ground that the complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is from 
that decision this appeal is taken. 
May it be pointed out that appellants do not dispute the 
rule that acts of legislatures are presumed to be constitutional 
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unless shown to be otherwise. On the other hand appellants do 
dispute the right of the trial judge to deprive them of the 
privilege of offering evidence for the purpose of proving that 
the act is unconstitutional as was done in the instant case. 
Neither is it disputed that the legislature may classify business 
for taxation and other purposes, provided that such classifica-
tions include all competitive businesses within the field covered 
by the classification. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CLASSIFICATIONS CANNOT BE DISCRIMINATORY 
OR ARBITRARY. 
Decisions involving an interpretation of the 14th amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States are so numerous 
and in most matters uniform that reference will be made herein 
to only a few of them. 
It is universally held that classifications for business or 
other purposes made by legislatures of the various states must 
not be discriminatory, capricious or arbitrary. This rule ts 
clearly stated in 12 A. Jur. 128 Paragraph 469, as follows: 
Page 129. ((It has been repeatedly said that the guar-
anty of the equal protection of the laws means that no 
person or class of persons shall be denied the same pro-
tection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or 
other classes in like circumstances, in their lives, lib-
erty, and property, and in pursuit of happiness. It has 
frequently been stated that tthe equal protection of the 
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' One 
court has added the concept that it means equality of 
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opportunity to all in like ci~cumstances. T?e guidin~ 
principle most often stated _by the courts ts that thts 
constitutional guaranty requtred that all persons_ ~hall 
be treated alike under like circumstances and condtttons, 
both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities 
imposed." 
On page 147 of the same volume of Am. Jur. it is 
stated that, 
((One of the essential requirements as to classification, 
in order that it may not violate the constitutional guar-
anty as to equal protection of the laws, is that the classi-
fication must not be capricious or arbitrary, but is based 
on some natural principle of public policy. 
''The rttle is well settled that atbitrary selection can 
never be justified by calling it classification. This is for-
bidden by the equal protection demanded by the Four-
teenth Amendment.'' 
Page 151: t(It is frequently difficult to determine 
whether a particular classification is reasonable or. un-
reasonable, and no definite rule has or can be laid down 
whereby this may be determined. The legislature cannot 
arbitrarily create a class, however, and when thus cre-
ated make it binding on the courts so that they would 
be bound to accept such classification as a proper one." 
The above principle has been upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court as well as the highest courts 
in most of the States. 
In the case of Hartford S.B.l. & Ins. Co. vs. Harrison, 
301 U.S. 459, 81 L.Ed. 1223, the Supreme Court of the 
U. S. passed on the constitutionality under the 14th 
atn~ndment of a law enacted by the Georgia Legislature 
a dtfferent bur?en upon stock tns_urance con1panies than 
upon mutual tnsurance companies under classification 
legislations. In finding the act unconstitutional the 
court stated: 
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"The applicable principle in respect to classifica-
tion has often been announced. It will suffice to quote 
a paragraph from Louisville Gas & E. Co. vs. Cole-
man, 277 U.S. 32, 37, 38, 72 L. Ed. 770, 773, 774, 
48 S. Ct. 423. 
(It may be said generally that the equal protection 
clause means that the rights of all persons must rest 
upon the same rule under similar circumstances ... 
and that it applies to the exercise of all of the powers 
of the state which can affect the individual or his 
property, including the power of taxation.' 
Later the court added, ((Discriminations are not 
to be supported by mere fanciful conjecture.--- They 
cannot stand'' as reasonable if they offend the plain 
standards of common sense. 
In Frost tJS. Corp. Corn. of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 
73 L.Ed 483, the same Court held as follows: 
((The purpose of the clause in respect of equal pro-
tection of the laws is to rest the rights of all persons 
upon the same rule under similar circumstances." 
In applying that rule to the case before it the court 
stated, ((Stripped of all immaterial distinctions and 
reduced to its ultimate effect, the proviso as here 
construed and applied, baldly creates one rule for 
a natural person and a different and contrary one for 
an artificial person, notwithstanding the fact that 
both are doing the same business with the general 
public and to the same end, namely, that of reaping 
profits. That is to say, it produces a classification 
which subjects one to the burden of showing a public 
necessity for his business, from which it relieves the 
other, and is essentially arbitrary, because based upon 
no real or substantial differences having reasonable 
relations to the subject dealt with by the legislature." 
In reversing the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 
the case of Power !Vldf. Co. vs. Harvey Sanders, 
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274 U.S. 490, L. ed. 1167, the court held: that in 
order for a classification to be legal under the 14th 
amendment ((the classification must rest on differ-
ences perti~ent to the subject in respect of which 
the classification is made." 
In Louisville Gas & El. Co. vs. Coleman, 277 U.S. 
39, 72 L. ed. 770, it was held that a law imposing 
a tax for recording mortgages wherein the debt is 
secured matured within five years while imposing 
no such tax for recording mortgages where the debt 
matures after five years was improper classification 
and therefore unconstitutional. In its discussion the 
court stated, ((In the first place it may be said gen-
erally that the equal protection clause means that the 
rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule 
under similar circumstances - - - the classification 
must be reasonable not arbitrary, and must rest upon 
some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so 
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated like." 
The courts, both Federal and State, so unanimously follow 
the above stated rules that it seems unnecessary to make further 
citations. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REA-
SONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION. 
In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged as follows: 
Para. 6 Sub Sec. 2: nSaid statute denies some operators of 
motels, hotels, tour.ist homes and trailer courts of the equal 
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protection of the laws applying to other operators of similar 
businesses.'' 
If that allegation could have been proved by evidence, then 
it follows that the legislation in question was discriminatory 
and therefore unconstitutional. Certainly plaintiffs should have 
been given an opportunity to offer evidence showing that the 
act imposes a burden upon some while exempting others who 
\Vere competitors in the same business, and that the legislature 
had arbitrarily created a classification which is discriminatory, 
unreasonable, unjust and therefore unconstitutional. Without 
such evidence the court was in no position to pass upon the 
constitutionality of the act. In fact in its decision the court 
stated: nTh ere may well be slight inequities in the operation 
of the statute, but perfection is not required." As to whether 
such inequalities were slight or great could not possibly be 
determined without evidence. Certainly the appellants were 
entitled to present evidence in the matter. Without such 
evidence the Court was in no position to make the ruling it did. 
POINT III 
THE CLASSIFICATION COMPLAINED OF WAS 
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY. 
The legislature in enacting paragraph ttf" of the sales tax 
law, apparently intended that tourists should be taxed on their 
rentals while in the state while permanent citizens should be 
exempted. The constitutionality of the provision in question 
must, therefore, depend on whether all of the tourist rentals 
or short term rental business of the state are being handled 
by the operations included in the classification, namely: tourist 
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homes, hotels, motels, and trailer camps. If the answer to that 
question is in the negative, it follows as a matter of law that 
t~1e classification is discriminatory and in violation of the 14th 
a~-nendment, for the courts will not permit a discriminatory 
c iassification. 
lt is well known in this state that there are many other 
S!J~~~~jses oliering rental accommodations to tourists and others 
'·)n a daily or weekly basis which are not included within the 
classification. For example, in most of the communities of the 
state, apartment houses offer accommodations on a weekly 
basis, particularly during the tourist season. To require a motel 
or hotel to collect a sales tax and exempt an apartment house 
from doing so is the rankest kind of discrimination. In various 
parts of the state transient workmen are offered temporary 
employment on road building and reclamation projects. If 
these workers live in a motel or hotel for less than a month, 
they must pay a sales tax, but if they occupy a housekeeping 
room in a private residence or in an apartment house on a 
daily or weekly basis they are required to pay no tax. In such 
cases a tax of two or three dollars over a two or three week 
period gives a distinct competitive advantage to the unclassified 
competition. 
Within the state are numerous guest houses, dude ranches, 
resorts, and rooming houses which offer rental accommodations 
for periods of less than one month, none of whom are included 
within the classification complained of and none of whom need 
collect a sales tax. Certainly it is obvious that such a situation 
is highly discriminatory and unjust. 
10 
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POIN1. IV 
THE LA \Y/ REQUIRES THAT ALL BUSINESSES FALL-
ING WITHIN THE SAME CLASS BE TREATED ALIKE. 
The Supreme Courts of two states have passed upon the 
constitutionality of sales tax laws on rentals and each of them 
has confirmed the principle that such legislation must include 
within the classifictaion all business falling within the same 
class. 
WHITE vs. 1\tlOOREJ 46 P.2nd 1077 (Arizona) 
This is a case wherein two points unrelated to the instant 
case were decided, namely whether the receiver of an insolvent 
bank which rents buildings must collect sales taxes on rentals 
even though sol vent banks must do so; and whether the lan-
guage nor any other business or occupation charging storage 
fees or rents" included business properties when the classifi-
cation intended by the legislature to apply only to residential 
property. Neither of these points apply to the issue before this 
court. 
The Arizona act as quoted by the court in its decision im-
posed a 2% sales tax ((upon every person engaged or continuing 
within this state in the following businesses: 
2. Hotels, guest houses, dude ranches, and resorts, room-
ing houses, apartment houses, automotive rental services, auto-
mobile storage garages, parking lots, tourist camps, or any 
other business or occupation charging storage fees or rents 
'' 
In that case, the constitutionality of the above classification 
was attacked on the grounds that it did not include business 
11 
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property rentals. The court rightly held that the legislature 
had a right under the 14th amendment to classify businesses 
renting residential property without including renters of busi-
ness property within the classification. In this connection the 
Court held: 
C(It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax is not 
a tax on property but a tax on the right to engage in 
business and that the Legislature may impose it on any 
class or classes of business it cares to and decline to 
apply it to others, its only limitation in this respect 
being that the classification it makes must be reasonable 
not arbitrary or discriminating and such- that all those 
falling within the same class will be treated alike.)) 
Plaintiffs agree that the above is a correct statement of the 
law. 
The Arizona act listed hotel, guest houses, dude ranches, 
resorts, rooming houses, and apartment houses as coming within 
the classifictaion and then included the phrase ttor any other 
business or occupation charging storage or rents." That lan-
guage included within the classification every business renting 
residential property whether on a day, week or monthly basis. 
This the legislature had a right to do for it treated all such 
businesses alike, and discriminated against no one. 
If the legislature of Utah had done likewise, this action 
would not have been .filed. But it did not so act. Instead it 
selected four of a dozen or more types of renters of residential 
properties on less than a monthly basis, each of which are 
in competition with the other and imposes the duty of collecting 
a sales tax on the four while allowing the remaining competi-
tors to rent their property without collecting such a tax from 
12 
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their tenants. Such action is discriminating, arbitrary, and un-
just for it fails to treat all those falling within the class of 
renting to the traveling public alike, and is therefore in violation 
of the equal protection amendment to the Constitution. 
There is no saving clause which includes all businesses 
within the classification in the Utah law as there is in the 
Arizona statute. Instead the Utah law limits the responsibility 
of collecting and imposing the tax on tourist homes, hotels, 
motels, and trailer camps and permits every other person 
engaged in the same class of business to go free from that 
responsibility. In Arizona every renter of property for resi-
dential purposes is included in the classification, while in Utah 
many who are engaged in the same type of business such as 
those who offer for rent apartments on a weekly basis, house-
keeping units, dude ranches units, boarding houses, private 
residence rooms and other competitive businesses in the same 
field of activity are exempt from such responsibilities. Under 
the Arizona law an owner of a residence, an apartment house 
in an area where road or reclamation projects are being con-
structed, who offers temporary accommodations to the work-
men thereon, must collect the same tax from their tenants as 
does the motel or hotel operator within the vicinity; while in 
Utah every one of those competitors of the hotel and motel 
operator in the same area are free from such impositions. To 
say to a moter operator in a town for instance where a tem-
porary road building project is underway, ((You must collect 
a tax from every workman who resides in your motel, but the 
operator of an apartment house next door or the renter of 
rooms in a private residence, each of whom are your com-
petitor for business from those workmen, need collect no tax 
13 
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from those who rent from them," is discrimination which 
destroys the protection afforded by the Constitution. 
Until the Utah law is made to include all of the competi-
tive business of hotels, motel, tourist homes, and trailer courts 
~-ts JS the case under the Arizona law, the law is arbitrary, dis-
. :1:1t ·ng; and unfair and is in violation of the federal Con-
GL1ULDEN vs. KIRK, 47 So. 2nd 567 (Florida) 
The above named Florida case was decided on issues, each 
one of which is unrelated to the one in the instant case. But 
in deciding that the Florida tax on motels, etc., was constitu-
tional the court indirectly supported the principle of law dis-
cussed above. 
Like the Arizona law, the one passed by the Florida Legis-
lature included all businesses renting living quarters. It dis-
criminated against none of them. The language of the statute 
1s as follows: 
c cIt is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that 
every person is exercising a taxable privilege who en-
gages in the business of renting, leasing or letting any 
living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommo-
dations - - - for the exercise of said privilege a tax is 
hereby levied - - - equal to three per cent ( 3%) of 
and on the total of rental charge - - - . " 
This statute includes everyone operating within the same 
field of business. No one is excluded from the operation of 
the law. Such a classification is constitutional for the same 
reason that the Arizona statute is constitutional. 
14 
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It is because the Utah statute does not include everyone 
within the class of such businesses that the Utah act is invalid. 
POINT V 
IS CLASSIFICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE REA-
SONABLE? 
The only remaining question seems to be whether it is 
reasonable and fair on the one hand or arbitrary and discrimi-
nating on the other for the Utah Legislature to single out 
tourist homes, motels, hotels, and trailer courts and place them 
in a classification requiring the collection of a sales tax, while 
exempting their competitors who are carrying on similar busi-
ness and offering accommodations to the same class of people 
in tnany instances under different designations. It is undis-
putable for instance that an apartment house offering accom-
modations on a weeki y basis is in the same business as a motel 
which does likewise, So likewise are private residences who 
offer temporary housing to workmen, or sportsmen, or visitors 
attending carnivals or church conferences, etc., in the same 
business as hotels and motels. In fact, as pointed out previously 
in this brief, there are a number of businesses in competition 
with the ones which the legislature has classified who are 
placed in an advantageous position through the enactment of 
the legislation objected to. 
In Utah the tourist business is seasonal, confined primarily 
to summer months. Operators of motels must rely on patron-
age from local citizens who cannot be classified as tourists 
in order to survive through the many off-tourist months. The 
legislation in question will give their competitors who are free 
15 
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from collecting sales taxes from short term tenants great ad-
vantages during those periods. 
There is no basis for such discrimination under the 14th 
amendment. If the legislature had taxed tourist trade and 
made a classification of every business offering accommodations 
to tourists, such a classification may have been justifiable. But 
to require motel operators to collect a tax not only from tourists 
but also from non-tourists who rent their accommodations 
and who provide for them a substantial portion of their annual 
revenue without imposing a similar responsibility on the many 
other competitive businesses who do not deal with tourists 
but do compete with motels for local trade, is unjust, unfair, 
arbitrary and discriminatory. Certainly it is not the kind of 
legislation which treats all persons alike under like circum-
stances and conditions as the courts require. There is no fair 
and reasonable difference between those engaged in offering 
living accommodations on a daily or temporary basis to both 
tourists and non-tourists, to justify a classification of part of 
them and excluding from the classification the others. 
In Gaulder vs. Kirk, 47 So. 2nd 567, the Court stressed the 
generally accepted principle that HCourts should ahvays give 
words in the statutes and constitutional provisions the meaning 
accorded them in common usage unless a different connotation 
is expressed in or necessarily implied from the context of the 
statute or constitutional provision in which they appear." 
Applying that principle to the instant case, the vlords 
((tourist homes, hotels, trailer courts, motels," have very dis-
tinct meanings in their common usage. They could not pos-
sibly be reasonably interpreted, nor are they interpreted by 
16 
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the Tax Commission to include within their tneaning apart-
ment houses offering accorr1modations on weekly basis, or 
housekeeping apartments operating by the week, or private 
residences offering temporary accommodations to workmen, 
conference visitors, etc., or dude ranches, or any other business 
which is competing with hotels, motels, tourist homes, or trailer 
camps for non-tourist as well as tourist trade, none of which 
are included within the provisions of the act. 
CONCLUSION 
If the legislative classification had been set up to cover 
all those serving tourists and the tax levied only on them, as 
against those serving local citizens who are temporarily away 
from their homes; or all those offering housekeeping services 
as against those who do not; or some other classification which 
included all businesses offering accommodations to people 
away from home, there might have been reasonable justification 
for the classification. But to arbitrarily select four businesses 
from a dozen similar businesses of the same nature, each com-
peting with the other, and imposing a burden upon the four 
which need not be borne by the others, is legally arbitrary, 
discriminating and unjust legislation which violates the equal 
protection amendment of the Federal Constitution, and departs 
widely from the fundamental doctrine universally adopted by 
the courts of a free land nthat all those within the same class 
shall be treated alike," White vs Moore} 47 P .2nd, 181 (5-6). 
Respectfully submitted, 
17 
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